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“To Hell in a Handbasket”: Teachers, Free Speech, and
Matters of Public Concern in the Social Media World
JESSICA O. LAURIN*
“A complete and utter jerk in all ways. Although academically ok, your child has no
other redeeming qualities.”1 Natalie Munroe, a Pennsylvania public school teacher,
blogged this comment as an example of what she would like to write on some of her
students’ report cards.2 Although her blog was not password protected, Munroe
claimed that her blog was meant to be for friends only; she only had nine subscribers.3 But Munroe’s blog—entitled “Where are we going, and why are we in this
handbasket?”4—generated public outrage after a reporter found the page and brought
it to the school district’s attention.5 Munroe blogged under the name “Natalie M” and
did not identify where she worked, where she lived, or her students’ names.6 Some
of her comments about students, however, were specific. For example, in her post
“Things From This Day That Bothered Me,” Munroe wrote, “[t]he fact that the jerk
who was out 3 days around our last major assessment because his family took him
on [a] trip to Puerto Rico . . . was out again today . . . because his family took him to
the effing Master’s golf shit over Easter break.”7
Word of Munroe’s blog spread like wildfire. Students distributed copies of blog
posts in the hallways, and parents requested that their children not be assigned
to Munroe’s class¾culminating in the school district’s decision to hire another
teacher to “shadow” Munroe to accommodate parents’ concerns.8 The national media

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law–Bloomington; B.A.,
2014, Kenyon College. Thanks to Professor Michael McGregor for his thoughts throughout
the Note-writing process; Professor Daniel Conkle for his help pointing me in the right direction; Notes & Comments Editors Drew Waldbeser and Rian Dawson for their insights and
edits; the Indiana Law Journal staff for their diligence and hard work; and, of course, my
family and friends who supported me the whole way.
1. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 459 (3d Cir. 2015).
2. Id. Other proposed comments include: “[c]oncerned your kid is automaton, as she just
sits there emotionless for an entire 90 minutes, staring into the abyss, never volunteering to
speak or do anything”; “[t]wo words come to mind: brown AND nose”; “[s]neaking, complaining, jerkoff”; “[j]ust as bad as his sibling. Don’t you know how to raise kids?”; and
“[d]resses like a street walker.” Id.
3. Id. at 458.
4. Id. (italics omitted).
5. Id. at 461–62.
6. Id. at 458.
7. Id. at 460.
8. Id. at 462. The school district received 200 “opt-out” requests from parents, all of
which were granted. Id. The teacher “shadow[ing]” Munroe would teach the exact same schedule, and the “shadow” teacher, rather than Munroe, would teach the students who “opt[ed]out.” Id.
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reported on the story,9 and Munroe appeared on several major television stations.10
During the school year’s last couple of months, Munroe went on her prescheduled
maternity leave.11 She returned the following school year and received negative performance reviews.12 That June, the school terminated Munroe.13 In response, Munroe
filed a retaliation action against the school district, the superintendent, and the principal, arguing that she was fired because of her blog comments—thus abridging her
First Amendment rights.14
Munroe is not alone. A school district in Cohasset, Massachusetts, forced June
Talvitie-Siple, a supervisor of a high school math and science program, to resign
after parents discovered her Facebook wall comments describing her students as
“germ bags” and their parents as “snobby” and “arrogant.”15 Across the country,
many public school teachers’ social media presence has led to adverse employment
actions rooted in the public employee free speech doctrine, which considers whether
the speech is a matter of public concern and balances the employer’s and the employee’s interests.16
Given the surge of adverse employment actions connected to social media, it is
important to note the ubiquity of social media sites. The growing use of Facebook
and Twitter, two popular forms of social media, is astounding. As of December 2016,
Facebook had 1.86 billion monthly active users17 and as of June 2016, Twitter had
313 million monthly active users.18 Perhaps more startling is the number of Facebook
and Twitter mobile users during these time frames; Facebook had 1.74 billion mobile

9. See, e.g., Andrea Canning & Olivia Katrandjian, Teacher Defends Insulting Blog
Posts About Her Students: ‘I Hear the Trash Company Is Hiring,’ ABC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/pennsylvania-teacher-wrote-insulting-blog-posts-students-suspended
/story?id=12929001 [https://perma.cc/4937-WH64].
10. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 462.
11. Id. at 463.
12. Id. at 464.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ki Mae Heussner & Dalia Fahmy, Teacher Loses Job After Commenting About Students, Parents on Facebook, ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology
/facebook-firing-teacher-loses-job-commenting-students-parents/story?id=11437248 [https://
perma.cc/467J-B8X5].
16. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008) (involving a
teacher’s MySpace comments); In re O’Brien, No. 108–5/11, 2013 WL 132508 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2013) (involving a teacher’s Facebook posts). As time goes on, it is
likely that even more cases similar to In re O’Brien and Spanierman will reach the courts. See
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (2012). The balancing test is referred to as “the Pickering balance”
and was established in Pickering v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see infra
text accompanying notes 45–47.
17. Company Info: Stats, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/K3H9-ZULS].
18. Twitter Usage/Company Facts, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company [https://
perma.cc/NR4W-V63B].
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monthly active users,19 and 82% of Twitter users were active on mobile devices.20
Given the continuous growth of social media use, it seems that social media will not
go away any time soon;21 it is inexorably a part of the modern world.22
Despite its potential problems, online speech can be valuable for teachers because
of its personal and professional uses.23 On a personal level, social media is used to
deepen connections and to maintain relationships with others.24 It can be used to unite
people with common interests who have never met in person.25 Professionally, social
media allows teachers to communicate with each other and with unions; it also provides a means to keep up-to-date with teaching techniques.26 But issues can arise
when students stumble across a teacher’s purely personal speech online.27 Because it
can be difficult for teachers to insulate their online speech from students, teachers
may refrain from using social media at all¾thus resulting in a chilling effect upon
speech that has First Amendment value.28 Even short of total social media abstinence,
a general fear of using social media may stop teachers from expressing their concerns

19. Company Info: Stats, supra note 17.
20. Twitter Usage/Company Facts, supra note 18.
21. Just seven years ago, Facebook reported 373 million monthly active users. Eric Eldon,
Facebook Traffic Reaches Nearly 375 Million Monthly Active Users Worldwide, Led by US,
ADWEEK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/facebook-traffic-reaches-nearly
-375-million-monthly-active-users-worldwide-led-by-us/234992 [https://perma.cc/K72J-52XM].
22. See Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 49 J.
MARKETING RES. 192, 192 (2012) (“Sharing online content is an integral part of modern life.”);
Emily H. Fulmer, Note, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in the Internet
Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. No. 014 ¶¶ 1, 6 (“Social networking websites are part of
modern American culture.”). While all age groups have increased their social media use over
time, younger generations use social media more on average. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW
RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/social-media/social-media
-use-by-age-group/ [https://perma.cc/NQF5-J6SW]. As of November 2016, 86% of adults
aged eighteen to twenty-nine use social networking sites, compared to ages thirty to forty-nine
(80%) and ages fifty to sixty-four (64%). Id. Therefore, it is logically inferable that future
generations—the ones being taught by teachers using the platform—are more likely to uncover
their teachers’ social media posts.
23. See Berger & Milkman, supra note 22, at 193 (“People may share emotionally
charged content to make sense of their experiences, reduce dissonance, or deepen social
connections.”).
24. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1606–07.
25. Id. at 1607.
26. Id. at 1606.
27. See Amy W. Estrada, Note, Saving Face from Facebook: Arriving at a Compromise
Between Schools’ Concerns with Teacher Social Networking and Teachers’ First Amendment
Rights, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 283 (2010) (“Because a teacher’s main objective in using
a social networking site is not to interact with students, some of their profile content may be
inappropriate in light of their professional responsibilities.”); see also Papandrea, supra note
16, at 1608 (arguing that Facebook often poses problems for teachers because “it is difficult
for users to present multiple personas to different audiences”).
28. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1607. Papandrea notes that privacy controls on Facebook
do not completely alleviate the problem, as privacy settings can be tough to navigate and can
be bypassed easily. Id. at 1608–09.
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about valuable topics online. They may hold back or temper their opinions in important political and social dialogues.29
The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech that addresses a matter
of “public concern,” meaning that the speech is the subject of “legitimate news interest,” or, put another way, “a subject of general interest and of value and concern
to the public at the time of publication.”30 Thus, categorizing the speech’s content is
a key part of First Amendment analysis. The varied content of social media posts,
however, complicates the content inquiry.31 Munroe’s case exemplifies the difficulties when an online poster blurs the personal and professional spheres. Between
August 2009 and November 2010, Munroe wrote eighty-four blog posts on varying
subjects. Some posts were school related, centering on Munroe’s coworkers, school
district administration, and students and their parents, while others were personal,
focusing on Munroe’s movie preferences, her children, and yoga classes.32 Several
posts contained both school-related and personal content.33 Given the breadth of topics that even a single post may address, it is difficult to define the content as either a
matter of public concern or not a matter of public concern. For example, Munroe
wrote, “The first semester of this school year, when I had a parade of whiny, entitled
kids run to the guidance department to tell on me for giving them the low grades they
earned on their shoddy papers, sort of scarred me. I consider myself very fair with
my grading.”34 Munroe’s words could be viewed either as a mere workplace gripe or
as part of a broader dialogue on millennials’ attitudes. The latter interpretation is not
farfetched. In fact, Munroe’s comments fit with what Professor Berenson has asserted: “[Millennials] want it all, they want it now, and believe that they deserve it.”35
The court’s analysis in Munroe exemplifies the difficulties in applying the public
concern doctrine in the social media context. Through the Munroe case, this Note
addresses current issues regarding the First Amendment’s public concern requirement. Its goal is to highlight tensions within the public concern doctrine and suggest
how courts should apply the doctrine in the social media context. This Note argues
that courts should narrow the scope of examined speech and place little weight on
the amount of media attention that the speech received. Although courts sometimes

29. See id. at 1607 (“To avoid the problems of controlling the audience for their information, some teachers simply . . . engage in significant self-censorship to post only the most
benign content.”).
30. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). The public concern
requirement is a prerequisite to reach the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which balances the employee’s interest in speech and the
employer’s interest in efficiency. Roe, 543 U.S. at 82.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74, 98.
32. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2015).
33. An example is a post entitled, “Things From This Day That Bothered Me.” Id. at 460.
It contained both of the following complaints: (1) “[t]he fact that several students in 3rd block
did a lame job on their easy assignment today,” and (2) “[t]he new chick who seems to be on
or near my elliptical all the damn time.” Id.
34. Id. at 461. Another example is Munroe’s comment that “this new-aged soft-oncrime/bribery and overindulgence is probably the reason that kids are so horrible today.” Id.
35. Steven K. Berenson, Educating Millennial Law Students for Public Obligation, 1
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 51, 54 (2008).
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reject First Amendment protection on the Pickering balancing test instead of the public concern issue, the public concern requirement is a threshold issue that plays a
critical role in successful First Amendment claims.36 Accordingly, courts need to revisit the public concern doctrine to ensure that its analysis is sound and yields the
correct outcome.
Part I provides background concerning retaliation claims, criticism of the public
concern requirement, and special issues that teachers face in the social media world.37
Part II identifies current issues with how courts apply the public concern doctrine.38
Finally, Part III suggests the best way to apply the public concern doctrine to address
problems unique to social media speech.39
I. RETALIATION AND TEACHERS’ VULNERABILITIES
This Part explains how the public concern requirement fits into the public employee free speech doctrine and into employment retaliation claims.40 It also addresses how public school teachers face unique problems when pursuing successful
retaliation claims.41
A. The First Amendment and Retaliation Claims
Public employees, like all citizens, have free speech rights under the First Amendment.42 Thus, “a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.”43 To succeed
in a retaliation claim, therefore, a public employee must first demonstrate that his or
her speech was protected under the First Amendment.44 Courts have long recognized
that a public employer’s interest in maintaining efficient performance sometimes
conflicts with the free speech rights of its employees.45 This recognition led to a special free speech doctrine for public employees developed in Pickering v. United

36. See infra text accompanying note 49; infra note 68 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part I.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part I.A.
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that teachers have First Amendment rights, although the rights are somewhat restricted). When a teacher
speaks online, the balance between the school’s and the teacher’s respective interests may tend
to tip toward the school; the speed at which online speech is spread may augment the disruption that the school seeks to avoid. See Heussner & Fahmy, supra note 15 (“The fact that [the
speech is] online makes it more easily findable and have a broader potential impact.” (quoting
Jonathan Ezor, Assistant Professor of Law and Technology at Touro Law Center)).
43. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
44. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014).
45. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Further, when public employees speak on matters related to the workplace, they are in the position to hinder governmental functioning.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
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States, where a teacher was terminated for his letter to a local newspaper that criticized the school board’s handling of prior tax proposals.46 The Pickering test balances an employer’s interests in efficiency and the employee’s interest in free
speech.47
The Pickering Court articulated the employee’s interest narrowly: the employee’s
interest “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.”48 Two subsequent United States Supreme Court cases refined the public employee free speech
doctrine. First, Connick v. Myers established that the employee’s speech must be
about a matter of public concern before the court even reaches the Pickering balance.49 According to the Connick Court, whether speech is a matter of public concern
“must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”50 A matter of public concern is “a subject of legitimate
news interest,” meaning “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public at the time of publication.”51 Second, the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos
held that public employees do not receive First Amendment protection when they
“make statements pursuant to their official duties” because public employees do not
speak in their capacity as citizens in such situations.52
In addition to showing that the First Amendment protects his or her speech, the
public employee must also show that there was a causal connection between the

46. 391 U.S. at 564–65.
47. Id. at 568.
48. Id. Later, the Court in Connick v. Myers explicitly stated why not every form of government speech should be a matter a public concern: “When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Further, the Court was concerned that considering all government speech a matter of public
concern would open the floodgates to constitutional causes of action. Id. at 149. “While as a
matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered
by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.” Id.
49. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to
conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”). But see Frances E. Faircloth, Note, Freedom of Speech and Government Employees:
A Reasonable Test for the Digital Age, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 55, 66–67 (2012) (arguing that
Connick did not, in fact, institute the public concern question as a threshold issue). The Court
in Connick arguably stated the opposite: “We do not suggest, however, that Myers’ speech,
even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the
First Amendment.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Nevertheless, courts have interpreted Connick
as establishing the requirement of public concern as a threshold issue; therefore, it is now
recognized as such. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (designating that the question of
whether or not the employee speech is a matter of public concern is the first question in determining whether or not the speech is protected).
50. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
51. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam).
52. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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alleged retaliatory action and the protected speech.53 If the public employee satisfies
these elements, the government may avoid liability by showing that it would have
taken the same employment action even if the employee had never spoken.54
B. Special Issues with Teachers
Teachers are especially vulnerable to employer retaliation when the school finds
that their social media posts are improper. As one scholar has noted, teachers using
social media “have faced severe punishments for posting content that school officials
claim interferes with a school’s educational mission, sets a bad example for students,
or is otherwise inappropriate or unprofessional.”55 While all areas of public
employment have expectations of professionalism, teachers have always been held
to a high standard.56 The main reason for this is that public school teachers have
ample opportunities to influence children and their development.57
Although social media cases highlight society’s high expectations for teachers,
our expectations existed long before social media became popular.58 Near our nation’s founding, community schools had a heavy Protestant presence that emphasized
morality.59 Even with a diminished religious emphasis long after the founding, strict
regulations persisted in schools. For example, rules from the early twentieth century
prohibited unmarried women teachers from wearing fewer than two petticoats60 and
from “keep[ing] company with men.”61 Moral expectations persisted into the midtwentieth century when states allowed school boards to terminate or suspend teacher
licenses for immoral behavior.62
Today, teachers are held to high standards offline and on social media.63 As social

53. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014); Spanierman v.
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 308 (D. Conn. 2008).
54. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986; Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
55. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1604.
56. See Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private
Speech on Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 148 (2012).
57. See Rachel A. Miller, Note, Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or Not?, 2011 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 637, 637 (stating that teachers are “mentors, coaches, and examples for the nation’s youth”).
58. See generally Angela Lumpkin, Teachers as Role Models Teaching Character and
Moral Virtues, J. PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE, Feb. 2008, at 45, 45.
59. John E. Rumel, Beyond Nexus: A Framework for Evaluating K–12 Teacher Off-Duty
Conduct and Speech in Adverse Employment and Licensure Proceedings, 83 U. CIN. L. REV.
685, 688–89 (2015).
60. Fulmer, supra note 22, ¶ 28.
61. Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with
Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1317
(2009).
62. Rumel, supra note 59, at 689–90. Rumel cites examples persisting into the twentyfirst century, such as legislation in the California Education Code. Id. at 690 n.29.
63. Miller, supra note 57, at 639 (“While parents and communities may want their students’ teachers to set a high example, teachers are average people that go to parties (sometimes
where alcohol is served) and rant out their frustrations of work or school to their friends (occasionally in unpleasant terms).”).
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media proliferates, we will likely see more and more teachers suffer adverse
employment actions due to their online speech.64 Because many teachers understand
that posting online may jeopardize their jobs, there is the risk that they may refrain
from speaking online altogether.65
II. CURRENT ISSUES WITHIN THE PUBLIC CONCERN DOCTRINE
The public concern requirement articulated in Connick has been widely criticized,
particularly within the social media context.66 Because the Supreme Court has not
addressed social media specifically, current precedent does not provide clear guidelines for when social media speech will meet the public concern requirement.67 Additionally, acute focus on public concern as a threshold requirement often precludes
courts from ever reaching the Pickering balance of government and employee interests in the first place, effectively eliminating the balancing test from the equation.68
Another criticism is that speech on social media often implicates both matters of
public concern and purely private speech, thus increasing the difficulty of its proper
classification.69
Perhaps because the public concern test can be difficult to apply, recent court
decisions—the latest being Munroe70—have dodged a full assessment of the issue
and have instead relied on the Pickering balance to dispose of the case.71 The Munroe

64. See Snyder v. Millersville University, No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
3, 2008), for an example. Snyder was a student teacher who was denied her degree after she
posted a picture of herself on MySpace wearing a pirate cap and holding a plastic cup with the
caption, “drunken pirate.” Id. at *6.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
66. See, e.g., Mark Schroeder, Keeping the “Free” in Teacher Speech Rights: Protecting
Teachers and Their Use of Social Media To Communicate with Students Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 200 (2013).
67. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1617. Papandrea also raises the question of whether it is
even necessary for non-work-related speech to meet the public concern requirement. Id.
68. Patricia M. Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can
School Boards Restrict What Educators Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 115, 125 (2010); see also Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1620 (arguing that it will be difficult for many social media cases to meet the public concern requirement). By virtue of being
a threshold requirement, the public concern element of course makes it more difficult for a
court to deem speech protected. However, several courts in recent teacher speech cases have
assumed that the speech is a matter of public concern, while ultimately denying the retaliation
claim on the Pickering balance. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, it may be that
the Pickering balance is more of a hurdle to teachers than the Connick threshold requirement.
69. See infra text accompanying note 98. This criticism is one of the main issues that this
Note addresses.
70. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 470 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e reluctantly
assume for the purposes of this opinion that Munroe’s speech satisfied the ‘public concern’
requirement.”).
71. See, e.g., Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We assume,
without deciding, that at least some of Richerson’s speech was of public concern . . . .”);
Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003) (“For purposes of Melzer’s claims,
we assume arguendo that his activity centers on a matter of public concern, and is thus protected.” (italics in original)).
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court’s unwillingness to decide definitively whether the speech addressed a matter
of public concern indicates discomfort applying the doctrine in this context. This Part
highlights two problems with the public concern requirement in teacher social media
cases: (1) the scope of the speech that the court examines, and (2) the role that media
attention should play in the court’s analysis.
A. The Scope of the Court’s Examination: “Cherry Picking”?
To determine whether speech is a matter of public concern, Connick provided
vague guidelines that require courts to examine the “content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”72 But social media speech complicates this inquiry: How broad is the “whole record”? If the contested speech comes
from one particular Facebook post, should the court examine just that post, or should
it examine the entire Facebook page? Because Facebook pages often contain both
protected and unprotected speech,73 the scope of what the court analyzes can be determinative. Social media presents problems that traditional media does not. Compared to Facebook speech, it may well be easier to determine whether a single editorial, for instance, addresses a matter of public concern as a whole.74
Attempting to follow Connick’s guidelines, the Third Circuit has applied a “no
cherry picking” rule, meaning that the court cannot “cherry pick” speech that is of
public concern while ignoring its overall form and context.75 Part II.A critiques the
“no cherry picking” rule, arguing that it is not necessarily a logical product of
Connick.76 Part II.A then underscores the relevant problems in Munroe77 before addressing the larger implications for social media free speech cases.78
1. Historical Inconsistency of the “Cherry Picking” Prohibition
Superficially, the “no cherry picking” rule properly adheres to the Connick
standard: A court must examine the entire record rather than mere portions of it.79
Munroe relies on authority from Connick and its progeny for the proposition that
courts cannot “cherry pick” while ignoring the overall context of the speech.80
While the “no cherry picking” rule has roots in Connick, a close reading of the
case reveals that the Connick Court itself “cherry picked.” In Connick, an assistant
district attorney opposed her impending transfer to another office and discussed the

72. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
73. Emily McNee, Note, Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First Amendment Protections
for Teachers in the Digital Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1818, 1838 (2013).
74. Id. at 1839.
75. See, e.g., Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467.
76. See infra Part II.A.1.
77. See infra Part II.A.2.
78. See infra Part II.A.3.
79. See supra text accompanying note 72.
80. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467 (“We can not ‘cherry pick’ something that may impact the
public while ignoring the manner and context in which that statement was made or that public
concern expressed. Our inquiry must also consider the form and circumstance of the speech in
question.” (quoting Miller v. Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2008)).
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matter with her superior.81 In response to her superior’s suggestion that other colleagues did not share her concerns, the assistant district attorney created and distributed a questionnaire to her colleagues that included a variety of matters: the office’s
transfer policy, office morale, a possible grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and any perceived pressure to work in political campaigns.82
With one exception, the court concluded that the questionnaire did not contain matters of public concern. The exception was the question whether employees “ever feel
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates.”83
Only analyzing that single question, the Court conducted the Pickering balance.84 By
doing so, the Connick Court “cherry picked” a question that addressed a matter of
public concern from the rest of the survey questions. This isolation is exactly what
other courts have interpreted Connick to prohibit.
2. Application and Problems in Munroe
Because the prohibition on “cherry picking” is not well rooted, it is unsurprising
that the court in Munroe struggled in applying it. The Munroe court noted that the
school district made a “strong case” for why the speech failed to meet the public
concern requirement.85 Munroe stated that she blogged to keep up with friends and
that most of her posts were not work related.86 Moreover, the school district stressed
“rather persuasively” that Munroe used her blog “to vent personal grievances or
express her visceral reaction to her daily experiences.”87
Even though the school district’s analysis conforms to Connick’s mandate of analyzing the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record,”88 the Munroe court “reluctantly assume[d]” that Munroe’s speech met the
public concern requirement.89 The court’s assumption is surprising given its observation that “Munroe’s various comments about her students arguably were no different than, inter alia, her restaurant critique.”90 In so commenting, the court implicitly
recognized that the blog overall was a forum for venting. Yet it proceeded to “cherry
pick” particular posts—isolated from the overall context—to support its “reluctant
assumption.” The court reasoned that Munroe’s list of proposed report card comments91 was included in a post that also criticized the school’s grading system, and
so the post “ultimately involved more” than personal grievances against her students
or the administration.92 Although it may be true that this post in particular “ultimately
involved more” than personal grievances, that does not mean that the overall thrust

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 149–50, 154.
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 469 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 32, Munroe, 805 F.3d 454 (No. 14-3509)).
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 470.
Id.
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 470.
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of the post addresses a matter of public concern. Even if the court is correct—that
the particular post addresses a matter of public concern—the court cannot examine
any one post in isolation without violating the “no cherry picking” rule. Moreover,
the court noted that “there were, at the very least, occasional blog posts that touched
on broader issues like academic integrity, honor, and the importance of hard work.”93
In singling out “occasional” blog posts as addressing matters of public concern, the
court, by definition, “cherry picked.”94
Why did the Munroe court “cherry pick” after explicitly stating that it could not
“cherry pick”?95 Perhaps the court implicitly recognized that the social media context, because of its vastness, necessitates “cherry picking.” As Munroe argued, it does
not make sense for the court to consider posts on “mundane topics like pie recipes
and movie reviews” because such posts are unrelated to what allegedly triggered the
school’s employment action.96 Although Munroe’s argument is logical—as the employee must show a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory action and the
protected speech—the court immediately noted that it could not “cherry pick” the
particular posts that likely triggered the employment action.97
3. Implications in the Social Media Context
As exemplified in Munroe, one of the primary issues in a court’s analysis is
defining the “whole record.” The greater the breadth, the greater the odds are that
particular speech will contain both public and private elements.98 Social media, unlike traditional print, is potentially infinite. As one scholar points out, “social media
involves extensive amounts of rapidly changing, interactive speech.”99 Social media
users can publish an endless number of posts with a click of a button.100 Given the
continual opportunity to post—whether from one’s computer or one’s phone—discerning the overall thrust of something so vast is potentially difficult.
Perhaps in recognition of this immense task, several courts have engaged in
“cherry picking.” For example, the court in In re O’Brien only analyzed two of the
teacher’s statements on Facebook: (1) “I’m not a teacher—I’m a warden for future
criminals!” and (2) “They had a scared straight program in school—why couldn’t [I]
bring [first] graders?”101 The court made no mention of other Facebook posts,

93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. An example is when the court referenced a “critical” post in which Munroe discussed
the grading process to support its conclusion that the public concern requirement was met. Id.
95. “[I]t is also well established that (as we explained in Miller) the courts ‘can not “cherry
pick” something that may impact the public while ignoring the manner and context in which
that statement was made or that public concern expressed.’” Id. at 469 (quoting Miller v.
Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2008)).
96. Id. Similarly, the defendants focused on the student-related posts in particular. Id.
97. Id.
98. Schroeder, supra note 66, ¶ 192.
99. Id. ¶ 191.
100. See id. (“[A]bout 62% of Facebook users update their status at least once every two
weeks. Most Facebook users comment on other users’ statuses even more frequently, at least
one to two days per week.”).
101. In re O’Brien, No. 108–5/11, 2013 WL 132508, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan.
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although it is unlikely that these were the only two Facebook posts on the teacher’s
page. Hemminghaus v. Missouri102 is another example where the court “cherry
picked.” In Hemminghaus, a court reporter for a state circuit court judge published
blog posts regarding her pending case against a nanny who allegedly abused the reporter’s children.103 Although the court reporter’s posts discussed the details of her
own case, the court held that the speech, “at least in part,” addressed a matter of
public concern.104 Clearly, the fact that at least some of her speech did not address a
matter of public concern was not fatal to the reporter’s challenge.105
As O’Brien and Hemminghaus illustrate, not all courts apply the “no cherry picking” rule, and for good reason. The rule restricts courts’ ability to hone in on the
speech that is actually relevant to the retaliation action in a potentially vast sea of
information. Moreover, the prohibition on “cherry picking” does not align with how
the Connick Court actually analyzed the form and context of the speech.106
B. The Role of Media Attention: A Red Herring?
In determining whether speech meets the public concern requirement, some courts
have considered the media attention that the subject of the speech has received.107 In
a way, analyzing the surrounding media attention is logical. As the Supreme Court
in City of San Diego v. Roe stated, a matter of public concern is “a subject of
legitimate news interest,” meaning “a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public at the time of publication.”108 Although it may make sense in
some instances to measure the media attention received in the public concern

11, 2013) (alterations in original). Another example where the court “cherry picked” is
Spanierman v. Hughes, in which the court noted that a teacher’s MySpace page contained
diverse content, including the teacher’s comments to other users, comments from other users
to the teacher, pictures, blogs, and poetry. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D. Conn. 2008). Although
the court held that virtually all of the teacher’s MySpace did not address matters of public
concern, one part did address a matter of public concern—the teacher’s poem about his opposition to the Iraq War. Id. at 310–11. True to the Connick Court’s analysis, the Spanierman
court held that the poem is protected speech. Id.
102. 756 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2014).
103. Id. at 1111.
104. Id. at 1111–12.
105. Craig v. Rich Township High School District 227 provides a similar example outside
of the social media context. 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013). In Craig, the court held that a
guidance counselor’s book entitled It’s Her Fault met the public concern requirement—even
if parts “viewed in isolation” would not. Id. at 1117. While the book contained sexually explicit language and addressed provocative topics, the court determined that the book, as a
whole, “addresses adult relationship dynamics, a subject that interests a significant segment of
the public.” Id. Although the court purported to conduct an analysis similar to that in Miller
and in Munroe, it actually mirrored that of O’Brien and Hemminghaus. “The fact that Craig's
book dealt with a subject of general interest to the public was enough to establish prima facie
First Amendment protection.” Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
107. See, e.g., Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 165 (2d
Cir. 2006).
108. 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam).
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analysis, how news disseminates in the modern age may potentially obscure the
speech’s true nature.109 Part II.B critiques the Munroe court’s analysis of media attention110 and analyzes the larger implications of media attention in the public concern analysis.111
1. Application and Problems in Munroe
Quickly after Munroe suffered adverse employment action, the national media
picked up her story with gusto.112 According to Munroe, she gave several interviews
to defend her entries and to focus attention on the nebulous “[e]ducation [d]ebate.”113
The court concluded that “the extensive media coverage of [Munroe’s] blog and the
statements she made to the media generally indicated that Munroe met the ‘public
concern’ element.”114 However, the court expressed skepticism that the news coverage had significant bearing on the public concern question. The court was “troubled”
for two reasons: first, that Munroe’s primary motivation in the interviews was to
defend herself, and second, that the record contained little-to-no evidence regarding
the content of the interviews apart from Munroe’s description of them.115 Additionally, the court made a persuasive point—albeit hidden in a footnote—that it was possible that the public did not actually care about Munroe’s views on the “education
debate,” but rather was interested in the blog posts and whether teachers can or
should make such comments.116 Indeed, most Internet headlines about Munroe do
not indicate a concern for modern education117 or anything resembling Munroe’s
comments about academic integrity.118

109. See infra text accompanying notes 137–38.
110. See infra Part II.B.1.
111. See infra Part II.B.2.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
113. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 470 (3d Cir. 2015). The court did
not provide any further explanation for what the “Education Debate” entails.
114. Id. at 470–71.
115. Id. at 470.
116. Id. at 471 n.8.
117. For example, an ABC headline was Teacher Defends Insulting Blog Posts About Her
Students: ‘I Hear the Trash Company Is Hiring.’ Canning & Katrandjian, supra note 9; see
also Edecio Martinez, Natalie Munroe Blog: Pa. Teacher Suspended over Online Blasts at
Students, CBS NEWS (Feb. 16, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/natalie
-munroe-blog-pa-teacher-suspended-over-online-blasts-at-students/ [https://perma.cc/9GADB225]; Jillian Eugenios, Teacher Who Called Students ‘Loathsome,’ ‘Rat-Like’ Is Fired,
TODAY.COM: NEWS (June 28, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.today.com/id/47994422/ns/today
-today_news/t/teacher-who-called-students-loathsome-rat-like-fired/#.WMme9c6yxlo [https://
perma.cc/B3WW-BF5U]. But see Vicki Glembocki, Natalie Munroe: A Tale of a Teacher in
the Digital Age, PHILA. MAG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.phillymag.com/articles/natalie
-munroe-a-tale-of-a-teacher-in-a-digital-age/5/ (discussing how Munroe is “trying to change
education”) [https://perma.cc/2JF2-6WGY].
118. See Munroe, 805 F.3d at 461 (“TWO days after my lofty speeches, and a single day
after they all signed the [honesty] pledge and pledge wall . . . someone [described as ‘“that girl
in the back in pink”’] had consciously made a cheat sheet and brought it in and intended to
cheat.” (alterations in original)).
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The dissent in Munroe makes a similar point, arguing that the interviews undoubtedly addressed a matter of public concern because Munroe’s interviews focused on
an ongoing debate: suspending teachers for criticizing their students online and the
“harsh realities of the 21st century classroom.”119 However, the dissent confuses the
public’s reaction to the post and the content of the posts themselves—which had
nothing to do with how teachers should behave on social media and how schools
should respond. If Munroe had blogged about how teachers are disciplined for their
social media speech, the dissent’s argument would be persuasive. However, Munroe
made no such comments.
Although the Munroe court’s discussion of Munroe’s media attention is brief, the
court’s affirmation that the media attention had bearing on the public concern question reveals that it is still something that courts consider. Even so, the court is reluctant to place much weight on media attention. Especially in light of the court’s questionable assumption that Munroe’s speech met the public concern requirement,120 it
seems that the Munroe court grasped to find support for its assumption. Examining
the current state of the media may help uncover why the court hesitated to give media
attention much analytical significance.
2. Implications in the Social Media Context
Social media has changed the face of journalism.121 Instead of reading only what
editors picked for the front page, many people read what pops up on their social
network accounts.122 What pops up on social media depends, in large part, on what
social media “friends” find interesting.123 And disseminating information on social
media is easy; it only requires a click of a button.124 As a result, social media allows

119. Id. at 483 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (quoting Kayla Webley, How One Teacher’s Angry
Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom Debate, TIME (Feb. 18, 2011), http://content.time.com
/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00.html [https://perma.cc/WC5M-APQF]).
120. Id. at 470.
121. See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1535–39 (2012)
(describing the decline of traditional print media); see also Ryan Holmes, Facebook vs. Twitter
vs. Snapchat: Who Will Win the News Wars?, LINKEDIN (Oct. 14, 2015), https://
www.linkedin.com/pulse/facebook-vs-twitter-snapchat-who-win-news-wars-ryan-holmes. Since
2009, viewership on top U.S. networks has dropped 19%. Id.
122. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1550–51 (“Readers do not automatically rely on the editorial judgment of professional newspaper editors even to create the front page. Instead, they
depend on their friends and social media networks to recommend what news to follow.”);
Brian E. Weeks & R. Lance Holbert, Predicting Dissemination of News Content in Social
Media: A Focus on Reception, Friending, and Partisanship, 90 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM.
Q. 212, 214 (2013) (describing how traditional communication through mass media is a “oneway, top-down, sender-driven, time-specific activity,” whereas social media communication
involves consumer choice).
123. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1550–51.
124. Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 214. Weeks and Holbert contrast the convenience of using social media to disseminate news with the more “onerous” task of sharing content using traditional media. Id. Compare sharing a news story on Facebook with clipping
stories out of newspapers to share with friends. See id.
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immediate “viralization and amplification” of information.125
The combination of bottom-up consumer choice and easy dissemination of information raises an important question: Does vast media attention indicate that the
content spread is of “legitimate news interest?”126 In other words, is what goes viral
truly “newsworthy”?127 Jonah Berger’s and Katherine L. Milkman’s seminal study
provides valuable insight.128 From a psychological perspective, the study aimed to
determine what makes something “go viral.”129 Berger and Milkman found that positive content tends to be more viral than negative content.130 However, their results
were more complex than a binary positive/negative divide. Berger and Milkman
broke positive and negative emotions down further into levels of “activation”:
Sadness, anger, and anxiety are all negative emotions, but while sadder
content is less viral, content that evokes more anxiety or anger is actually
more viral. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis about how
arousal shapes social transmission. Positive and negative emotions characterized by activation or arousal (i.e., awe, anxiety, and anger) are positively linked to virality, while emotions characterized by deactivation
(i.e., sadness) are negatively linked to virality.131
If Berger and Milkman are correct, what garners media attention has less to do with
the content itself and more to do with the type of emotion the content evokes—which
in turn affects what is shared. And what individuals choose to share shapes what
becomes viral in public discourse.132
Berger’s and Milkman’s study has important implications for litigation involving
social media. Stories that provoke high levels of emotion are more likely to get lots
of circulation. This is exactly what happened in Munroe’s case. Her blog “went
viral,” which led to an extreme public reaction in which students and parents voiced
“shock and outrage” that Munroe wrote such “derogatory” comments.133 As one
scholar noted, “to the extent that the selection of stories is influenced by trending on
Twitter, it is possible that attention will be distracted by ‘superheated’ stories whose
relative importance is not assessed.”134 For example, a 2011 study of trending on

125. Levi, supra note 121, at 1553. Note that sharing on social media often snowballs into
more sharing using this venue. See Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 215 (“The more
frequently people receive news via social media, the more likely they are to disseminate it
within that same environment.”).
126. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam).
127. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1565–66 (discussing what is considered “newsworthy”
in the modern age in relation to what is “trending” on Twitter).
128. Berger & Milkman, supra note 22.
129. Id. at 192.
130. Id. at 199.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 201; see also Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 213 (“What makes social
media a unique platform for news is the ability it affords citizens to now act as efficient content
distributors, and it is necessary to understand if and when people disseminate news in this
digital environment.”).
133. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2015).
134. Levi, supra note 121, at 1566.
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Twitter found that news about Justin Bieber was more popular than news about world
affairs.135
While public concern is not measured by its “importance,”136 factors apart from
the content of the speech itself may potentially obscure why something is getting
media attention.137 The problem is acute in social media cases like Munroe’s, where
the teacher makes offensive comments about his or her students, because these cases
are attention grabbing and tend to evoke strong reactions.138 There is a danger that
courts will conflate “newsworthiness” with “virality,” thus placing the focus on the
public’s reaction to the speech rather than the speech itself.
III. BEST WAY TO APPLY THE PUBLIC CONCERN DOCTRINE
Given the rise of social media, a reexamination of the public concern requirement
is necessary. While the particular “speech” that a court analyzes often contains more
than one statement, the number of statements involved in social media cases is likely
to be much more expansive than in traditional media. Moreover, as individuals post
ever more frequently on a variety of websites regarding a variety of topics, it becomes
easier to share news within social media platforms.
Courts must take these changes into account when analyzing whether the public
concern requirement is met in social media cases. This Part suggests how courts
should tweak their analyses of the public concern requirement in the social media
age. First, Part III.A proposes that courts narrow the scope of the particular speech
they examine.139 Then, Part III.B suggests that courts should give little consideration,
if any, to the amount of media attention that the speech receives.140
A. Courts Must Narrow the Scope of the Particular Speech They Examine
As the Third Circuit’s opinion in Munroe makes evident, determining whether
speech on social media meets the public concern requirement can be difficult. The
main source of trouble is the potential breadth of online speech. In Munroe, the court
faced a variety of topics, from favorite foods,141 to frustrating students,142 to modern

135. Id. at 1565–66.
136. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
speech need not address a topic of great societal importance, or even pique the interest of a
large segment of the public, in order to be safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18.
138. See supra text accompanying note 133; see also Berger & Milkman, supra note 22,
at 214 (“More emotional, positive, interesting, and anger-inducing and fewer sadness-inducing
stories are likely to make the most blogged list. Notably, the effect of practical utility reverses:
Although a practically useful story is more likely to make the most e-mailed list, practically
useful content is marginally less likely to be blogged about. This may be due in part to the
nature of blogs as commentary.” (emphasis omitted)).
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. See infra Part III.B.
141. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2015).
142. Id.
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music.143 To reduce the extent of the speech that courts must deal with—and to zero
in on the speech that is germane—courts should focus on specific online posts rather
than the social media page’s entirety.
A separate analysis for each post would make it easier for courts to classify the
speech properly. Instead of having to determine the overall thrust of a potentially
broad array of materials,144 in most cases courts could focus on a modest amount of
speech.145 This narrow focus would reduce the instances where the court would have
to make sweeping, perhaps arbitrary, statements about the overall thrust of the
speech.146
Moreover, courts can focus on posts that are reasonably relevant to the employment action.147 By focusing on posts that reasonably could have played a role in the
school’s termination decision, a court would not need to examine every single one
of an individual’s Facebook posts from the page’s inception. Which speech played a
role in the employment action may not be abundantly clear in all cases, but it likely
would not be difficult for the courts to eliminate evidently irrelevant speech.148 It is
important to remember that establishing that the speech was protected is only a preliminary step in a successful retaliation claim; the employee must also show that
there was a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory action and the protected
speech.149 If it is obvious that parts of a blog bear no relation to the employment
decision, there is little value in the court deciding whether those parts met the public
concern requirement.150
Even though examining individual posts separately has its benefits, sometimes
examining the webpage’s broader context is a useful analytical tool. Social media
can be used to tell a narrative. According to Munroe, her blog was “replete with
references to her life’s experience as an English teacher in an affluent, suburban
Philadelphia School District.”151 The general themes throughout a social media page

143. Id. at 460.
144. See Schroeder, supra note 66, ¶ 191 (“A typical Facebook page, for example, contains
numerous text postings and a variety of pictures and videos. These postings likely involve
some political or religious speech as well as speech on personal matters.”).
145. Reducing the scope of what the court examines makes the social media speech more
finite, more like a single editorial. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
147. Munroe argued that the court should not examine every single one of her posts because some were clearly not a part of the controversy. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469. Her posts on
pie recipes, for example, obviously bore no relation to the employment action against Munroe.
See id.
148. See id.
149. See supra text accompanying note 53.
150. In Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008), the court
“cherry picked” portions of the teacher’s MySpace page. The court held that only the teacher’s
poem about the Iraq War was protected, and thus continued the analysis. Id. The court found
no evidence of a causal connection between the poem and the school’s employment decision.
Id. Because complaints about the teacher’s page had to do with his “very peer-to-peer like”
posts as well as pictures of naked men, it seems silly for the court to waste words in its opinion
analyzing the political poem. Id. at 298.
151. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469 (quoting Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 23, Munroe,
805 F.3d 454 (No. 14-5309)).
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could conceivably provide insight into the nature of a particular post or posts. Perhaps a court could examine a cluster of posts together when their nature is truly ambiguous. But it is unnecessary to discern the webpage’s overall theme regarding posts
that are obviously unrelated to the theme. The purpose of examining posts separately
is to excise certain topics from the court’s analysis that clearly have no bearing on
the employment decision. Allowing courts to escape the “overall thrust” analysis for
the entire page would save time and words.
B. Media Attention Should Play a Minimal Role in the Public Concern Analysis
Although the court in Munroe did not spend a great deal of time discussing
Munroe’s media attention, the fact that it focused on it at all may have been a mistake.
Relying on media attention as support for its “reluctant[] assum[ption]” that the public concern requirement was met,152 the court shifted focus from the blog’s content
to the public’s reaction to it.153 Because considering media attention may obscure the
analysis, courts should place little—if any—emphasis on the media surrounding the
controversy within the public concern analysis.
If courts do not consider the level of media attention, they will avoid problems of
identifying what the media attention was really about. In Munroe, for example, the
court grappled with the true reason why Munroe’s case was making such a splash.
Did it have to do with the “education debate,”154 whether teachers should be fired for
making such comments,155 the pure viciousness of the comments,156 or something
else entirely? If the courts ignore the amount of media attention as a consideration,
they will not have to discern whether the public reacted to the posted content itself.
Although media attention may potentially confuse the analysis, media attention
can play a legitimate role in assessing the public concern inquiry.157 The big question
is whether media attention—which today often involves viral content—is an indication of newsworthiness. There is not a clear answer, but in some cases it seems that
the answer is yes. It has been posited that the Black Lives Matter movement158 and
the Egyptian Revolution159 would not have become as widespread without social

152. Id. at 470.
153. See supra text accompanying note 114.
154. See supra text accompanying note 116.
155. See supra text accompanying note 119.
156. See supra text accompanying note 138. The importance of whether “virality” is an
indication of “newsworthiness” is especially salient in this context.
157. For example, in Cioffi v. Averill Park Central School District, a school athletic director was suspended for his letter and press conferences regarding the school’s handling of a
hazing incident. 444 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the court did not consider the
media attention surrounding the hazing, it noted that “the fact of actual public interest further
convinces us that Cioffi’s communications touch upon matters of public concern.” Id. at 165.
However, there was already a “media frenzy” surrounding the hazing even before the teacher
spoke; unlike in Munroe, the media attention was not reactionary. Id.
158. See Katie Dupere, How Black Lives Matter Made the Leap from Social Media to Social Action, MASHABLE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/09/19/black-lives-matter
-social-good-summit-2016/#PCgSevc1Vgqw [https://perma.cc/8WVD-62U3].
159. See Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video That Helped Spark the Egyptian
Uprising, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa
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media platforms and the rise of “digital-enabled citizen journalism.”160 News
surrounding the Egyptian Revolution went “viral” and likely contained “subject[s]
of legitimate news interest.”161
However, if the speech at issue involved events such as the Egyptian Revolution,
a court would not likely need to resort to media attention in order to conclude that
the speech constituted a matter of public concern.162 Instead, a court would more
likely base its decision primarily on the content.163 In easier public concern inquiries,
then, examining the role of media attention may not serve as a particularly useful
tool.
But what about when the public concern question is not clear-cut? In these instances, courts may examine media attention to support a reasonable answer.164
When there is uncertainty regarding why the speech garnered media attention, there
is a greater concern that a reactionary media obscured the true nature of the speech—
perhaps by emphasizing certain aspects of the story that are more emotionally
charged without delving into the speech’s actual content. Connick requires that the
speech itself must address a matter of public concern to be protected.165 Thus, courts
should not allow media attention to cloud the analysis and detract or distract from
analyzing the speech at issue.
CONCLUSION
Given the difficulties that the public concern requirement poses, scholars have
called for various solutions. Some scholars suggest that it is best to eliminate public
concern from the public employee speech doctrine altogether.166 Others suggest shifting the public concern element from a threshold requirement to a lesser role in the
analysis. For example, public concern could be merely a factor in the balancing

_mahfouz_the_youtube_video_that [https://perma.cc/7RP9-B98S]; see also Timothy McGrath,
14 Protest Videos That Went Viral and Changed the World, SALON (Feb. 25, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/02/25/14_protest_videos_that_went_viral_and_changed_the_world
_partner/ [https://perma.cc/LE2X-LQYT].
160. Holmes, supra note 121.
161. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam).
162. Political expression is generally protected with little inquiry. See Spanierman v.
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that the teacher’s poem about
the Iraq War could constitute political expression, which would render it protected under the
First Amendment).
163. As the court in Cioffi noted, “We do not mean to say that if there is no media interest
in the subject matter of the employee’s speech that the speech is not of public concern. Rather
in this case, the fact of actual public interest further convinces us that Cioffi’s communications
touch upon matters of public concern.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 444 F.3d 158,
165 (2d Cir. 2006).
164. Munroe is a good example. See supra text accompanying note 120.
165. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
166. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1630 (noting that the public concern requirement allows the government to restrict speech without showing disruption); see also
Schroeder, supra note 66, at ¶ 182 (arguing that the public concern requirement should be
eliminated with respect to a teacher’s off-campus speech).
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test.167 While the public concern requirement has its faults, its purpose is still relevant
today. The public concern requirement is a gate-keeping tool for federal court
claims.168 Given the rise of social media and the unprecedented fact patterns that
court must analyze,169 the public concern requirement may very well help keep certain claims out of the system.
While judicial efficiency is important, reaching the correct result is imperative.
Thus, how courts apply the public concern doctrine should be tweaked to account for
unique aspects of social media. Social media pages that contain lots of posts—often
unrelated to the litigation—make for a more difficult public concern analysis. To
target relevant speech that will actually have bearing on the substantial motivation
question and to alleviate a potentially daunting task,170 courts should analyze posts
separately when answering the public concern question. Moreover, to avoid obscuring the speech’s true nature, courts should avoid using related media attention as a
factor in the public concern analysis. However the courts decide to analyze the public
concern requirement in the future, they must continually reassess the doctrine to ensure that it makes sense considering ever-evolving platforms.

167. Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in
the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413, 429 (2002). Note that the Munroe court essentially
injected the weak public concern interest into the Pickering balancing test. Munroe v. Cent.
Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Given our reluctance to assume that the
speech at issue here implicated a matter of public concern in the first place, we determine that
the interests of Munroe and the public in this speech were entitled to (at best) only minimal
weight under the Pickering balancing test.” (italics in original)).
168. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Connick, 461 U.S.
at 149 (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public
concern would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a
public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”).
169. Consider also the possibility that new advancements in social media may spark further
free speech litigation issues that we cannot now even imagine.
170. See supra text accompanying note 53.

